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Gibbardian Humility: Moral Fallibility and Moral Smugness1 
 
This is my version of a paper published in The Journal of Value Inquiry 48, 2014, pp. 
235-245. DOI 10.1007/s10790-014-9420-6. Please refer to the latter when quoting or 
citing  
 
Abstract 
 
Andy Egan objects to quasi-realism that quasi-realists are 
committed to a form of smugness: when confronted with cases 
of fundamental disagreement, the quasi-realist must see 
him/herself as immune to moral error in a way that others are 
not. I urge that the concern can be tamed by considering the vice 
of smugness and the role it and its corresponding virtue should 
play in moral conversations. Here the quasi-realist need suppose 
no asymmetry to obtain between the level of epistemic humility 
he is prepared to extend to of moral disagreement and the level 
he expects from others.  Such considerations suffice to tame 
(JDQ¶VFRQFHUQSURYLGLQJZHIROORZ$OODQ*LEEDUGLQ
understanding the quasi-realist to be committed only to a modest 
and not to a grandiose form of moral objectivity.  
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 (DUOLHUYHUVLRQVZHUHJLYHQWRWKHFRQIHUHQFHRQ³.QRZLQJ:KDWWR'R´DWWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI.HQWDW
Canterbury, 9th-10th April, 2011 and to a workshop on the Limits of Realism about Value and Taste at 
the Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen on 17th December 2012. I am grateful to 
the other participants on both these occasions. I would also like to thank Heather Arnold, Holly 
Lawford-Smith,  Jonathan Smith and Valerie Tiberius for helpful discussion. I am particularly grateful 
to Sabine Roeser and Joel Rickard for their painstaking comments on the near-final version.  
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Those whose Way is not the same cannot take counsel 
together. 
     Confucius, Analects XV, 40 
 
1. Quasi-Realism and Fundamental DisagreemenW(JDQ¶V3UREOHP 
 
I believe that it is wrong to open your boiled egg at the big 
end. You believe that it is not wrong to open your egg at the big end. 
We are at an impasse. The impasse might not be deep. One of us 
might just be wrong on some matter of prosaic nonnormative fact. 
But perhaps that is not the case. Even if we both came to be fully 
informed about all relevant facts, our disagreement might persist. 
Perhaps other rational means are available to resolve our 
disagreement. Perhaps if I became more sensitive, more imaginative, 
more considerate of others¶QHHGV, I would change my mind. And 
SHUKDSVE\P\RZQSUHVHQWOLJKWVRQH¶VPRUDOVHQVLELOLW\LV
improved by being changed in these ways, so that this would be, 
again by my own present lights, a change for the better. Perhaps 
your contrary view would not prove robust in circumstances where 
you had to endure great suffering and, by your lights, respect is only 
GXHWRGHOLYHUDQFHRIRQH¶VPRUDOVHQVLELOLW\WKDWDUHVRUREXVW%XW
perhaps nothing like this is true. Perhaps there is no way our 
respective sensibilities might develop in ways that our respective 
sensibilities would themselves recognize as improvements with the 
upshot of resolving our disagreement. Disagreement which is in this 
way, deeply intractable, Andy Egan has called fundamental moral 
disagreement.2 ,¶OOIROORZKLPLQWKLVVRIRUQRZZKHQ,WDONDbout 
fundamental disagreement, this is what I mean. 
Different theories might say different things about this sort of 
case. One view, held by what we might call the optimistic rationalist, 
might deny its possibility, even in principle, by maintaining that all 
moral disagreement can be resolved by appeal only to the facts and 
to norms of rationality so formal and thin that any creature deserving 
the name of rational might be expected to respect and observe them. 
Kantians, or some of them, perhaps qualify as optimistic rationalists. 
I shall take it here that optimistic rationalism is false. 
Others might go relativistic. Perhaps there is no such thing as 
absolute moral truth but only truth relative to a certain sensibility. So 
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 Egan 2007. 
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big-ending is wrong-subscript-me and OK-subscript±you. But that 
can seem to handle the intractability of our disagreement by, in 
effect, defining it out of existence. That big-ending is wrong-
subscript-me and OK-subscript±you is something we can both 
recognize, so what on earth were we arguing about?  
Robust realists reject this relativising move. We cannot agree 
but nonetheless The Truth Is Out There. At most one of us is 
fortunate enough to be endowed with intuitions that have 
successfully tracked it. But the robust realist position can seem 
fraught with mystery. Many robust realists these days eschew 
naturalism: the moral facts, they typically insist, are not constituted 
by the natural facts and yet they seem somehow to depend upon 
them. How is this dependency supposed to work? And how indeed is 
such intuition to be understood , this curiously ad hoc capacity for a 
grotesquely underdescribed species of extra-sensory perception by 
which such realists suppose we somehow detect these strange, one 
might even say, queer facts.  
Seeking to navigate a distinctive path through this 
philosophical thicket, we find the expressivist. For expressivists our 
disagreement is, as Stevenson famously put it, a disagreement in 
attitude3, a disagreement, we might follow Gibbard in saying, about 
what to do.4 That saves the genuineness of the disagreement but 
avoids the metaphysical extravagance and epistemological 
bankruptcy that threatens to shipwreck the robust realist. 
Expressivism, however, faces many objections. Andy Egan, in 
KLVSDSHU³4XDVL-5HDOLVPDQG)XQGDPHQWDO0RUDO(UURU´
UDLVHVDQLQWHUHVWLQJQHZRQH(JDQ¶VPRUHSDUWLFXODUWDUJHWLVWKH
quasi-realist, the expressivist who seeks to preserve intact, as Egan 
SXWVLW³ELJDQGLPSRUWDQWFKXQNVRIRUGLQDU\PRUDOGLVFRXUVHDQG
SUDFWLFH´5.  Some such chunks may be more important than others. 
The chunk that interests Egan is concerned with first-person 
fallibility. No one, says the chunk in question, is immune to moral 
error. In particular I am not immune to moral error. More 
particularly still, I am not immune to moral error in just the same 
way that you ± and others ± are not immune to moral error. An 
expressivist might conceivably be willing to dispense with this 
insistence and we might argue, in that case, whether he still deserved 
                                                 
3
 Stevenson 1944, chapter 1.  
4
 Gibbard 2003. 
5
 Egan 2007, pp. 206. 
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the name of quasi-UHDOLVW%XW(JDQ¶VFRQFHUQVKDYHFOHDUad 
hominem force against the leading British exponent of the view 
Simon Blackburn, who endorses common sense on this point. 
Backburn is clear, as Egan documents, that supposing myself 
LPPXQHIURPHUURULQZD\VRWKHUVDUHQRWZRXOGEH³XQSDUGRQDEO\
VPXJ´6.  
Egan cannot see how Blackburn can avoid smugness. For an 
expressivist to say that you are wrong is simply to express a moral 
sensibility, where that is something roughly along the lines of a 
complex emotive state, that rejects what you do or say. So far so 
straightforward. With similar straightforwardness, I can condemn as 
wrong, the actions or opinions of myself at other times, expressing a 
sensibility at odds with them. But how is the expressivist to 
understand the thought that I might, here and now, be in error, a 
thought that all who are otherwise than smug should surely 
VRPHWLPHVHQWHUWDLQ%ODFNEXUQ¶s account of first person fallibility 
is one that understands the possibility that I might be wrong in terms 
of the possibility that I might be led to revise my moral view as a 
result of an improving change in my moral sensibility (improving by 
my own present lights). And of course I should recognize the 
possibility of such improvements. By my own present lights, 
perhaps, a moral sensibility is improved when it becomes better 
informed, more coherent, more sensitive, imaginative, etc. And I am 
not so vain as to suppose I could not become better informed, more 
coherent, more sensitive etc. If I would change my big-end moral 
preference as a result of such an improvement, in a way, we should 
maybe add, that would then be robust against still further such 
improvements, then, by my own present lights, my preference is 
wrong. 
But with my big-end preference, this is, ex hypothesi, not the 
case. Ex hypothesis, the disagreement here is fundamental. There is 
nothing that would count, by my own present lights, as an 
improvement that would change it. So, given that hypothesis, there 
seems nothing for the thought that I might be wrong to be. The same 
is also true, by your lights, of your opposing thought. But I can 
easily enough reject that as wrong. That is simply to express my 
moral sensibility that says you are, and, having such a sensibility, I 
can readily do that. But the thought that I am in error in a case where 
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 Blackburn 1998, p. 318, quoted by Egan 2007, p. 210. 
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no improving change would issue in revision, seems unavailable. 
Smugness seems inescapable. 
Some resistance can be summoned from the thought that 
though a given moral view of mine might have this property of being 
robust in the face of improving changes, I could never know this for 
sure of any particular such view, and that uncertainty would go some 
distance to keeping smugness, for all practical purposes, safely at 
bay.7 But a worrying asymmetry remains. Egan puts it thus:  
 
:KDW,¶YHJRWLVDJXDUDQWHHWKDWnone of my moral beliefs are 
fundamentally mistaken ± that is, stable but incorrect. That is, 
,¶YHJRWD JXDUDQWHHWKDW,¶PQRWLVRODWHGIURPWKHPRUDOWUXWKLV
VXFKDZD\WKDW,FDQ¶WHYHUFRPHWREHOLHYHLWE\DQ\SURFHVVRI
UHYLVLRQWKDW,¶GHQGRUVH8  
 
I appear to have such a guarantee of non-isolation and you do not 
and that may well look like a case of just the smugness Egan wants 
to avoid.  
 Blackburn has objected in response9 WKDW(JDQ¶VDUJXPHQW
equivocates between two thoughts, (1) the thought that something in 
my moral outlook can be regarded as true if no improvement would 
undermine it, and (2) the thought that something can be regarded as 
true if nothing I would recognize as an improvement would 
XQGHUPLQHLWLV%ODFNEXUQ¶VIDYRXUHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIPRUDO
truth and it commits him to no asymmetries. Egan thinks it does only 
because he confuses LWZLWK%XWSHUKDSVWKLVFRPSODLQWGRHVQ¶W
seem quite adequate to tame the concern. The quasi±realist should 
perhaps still be worried about the sort of case Egan focuses on, 
where you and I are in fundamental moral disagreement, such that I 
reject what you say and so does anyone with a sensibility I admire or 
could be brought to admire were I only, by my own lights, a bit more 
admirable; the worry being that there is, in a case such as that, just 
nothing for the thought to be that, in a case such as that, you might 
be right while I am wrong. It fails to represent an intelligible genuine 
possibility. And perhaps that leaves the quasi realist looking 
unpardonably smug LQDZD\WKDW%ODFNEXUQ¶VILQHVVLQJGRHVQRW
much help with. 
                                                 
7
 Heather Arnold has emphasized in conversation the significance of this point.. 
8
 Egan 2007, p. 214. 
9
 Blackburn 2009.  
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2 . Quasi-Realism and Mind-Independence: 6WUHHW¶V3UREOHP 
 
  Let me also draw attention to another recent critic of quasi-
UHDOLVP6KDURQ6WUHHWLQKHUSDSHU³0LQG,QGHSHQGHQFH:LWKRXWWKH
Mystery: Why Quasi-5HDOLVWV&DQ¶W+DYHLW%RWK:D\V´. Street 
raises an objection to quasi-realism that has a clear affinity with 
(JDQ¶V10. Quasi-realists, Street observes, seek to vindicate their right 
to say the things realists say. In particular they seek to vindicate their 
right to speak of mind independent normative truths. Both Blackburn 
and Gibbard have urged that the quasi-realist can do this.11 Killing 
children for fun is wrong whether or not I think so. In saying that, I 
simply express, on this quasi-realist view, a disapproving attitude of 
mine to killing children for fun that applies not just in the present 
circumstances where I hold that attitude but to others where I do not. 
There are possible worlds where I do not disapprove of killing 
children for fun but I, located at the actual world, disapprove of 
killing children for fun even in those worlds. According to my moral 
VHQVLELOLW\WKHZURQJQHVVRINLOOLQJFKLOGUHQIRUIXQGRHVQ¶WGHSHQG
on the facts about my moral sensibility. And in that way we 
accommodate the idea that moral value is mind independent.  
But now Street sees a danger in the quasi-realist project. To 
the extent that quasi-realists do earn themselves this right, they risk 
opening themselves up to objections that also face realists. For if one 
earns the right to say what realists want to say, one may find oneself 
contaminated with the same commitments suspicion of which might 
credibly have motivated rejecting realism in the first place. And, 
Street contends, quasi-realists who maintain that they can make good 
sense of the idea of mind independent normative truths render 
themselves vulnerable to her own favourite objection to realism, that 
is, to an argument from a Darwinian dilemma.12  
 Roughly it goes as follows. Our normative sensibilities, the 
tendencies we have towards particular normative judgements, have 
been massively influenced by evolutionary forces. So we may ask: is 
this process of evolutionary influence one that has some tendency to 
track the mind-independent normative truth or is it not? The first 
horn, that this process does track these truths, Street rejects on the 
                                                 
10
 Street 2011. Street herself notes the affinity on p. 23, note 43.  
11
 Blackburn 1984, chapter 6, Gibbard 2003, chapter 9. 
12
 First stated in Street 2006.   
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grRXQGVWKDWLWLVDVVKHSXWVLW³VFLHQWLILFDOO\LQGHIHQVLEOH´13  The 
second horn, that these evolutionary forces do not shape our 
normative sensibilities in ways that respond to any such mind-
independent truth, leads to a hopeless scepticism where we have no 
reason at all to imagine that our sensibilities are in any way a 
reflection of these independent truths, whatever they are ± and 
indeed, on this horn of the dilemma, they might, Street urges, be 
anything. And this dilemma, she urges, is applicable to any view 
which takes the normative truth to be mind-independent, including 
quasi-realism. 
 6WUHHW¶VSDSHUZDVSXEOLVKHGDORQJVLGHDUHVSRQVHE\$OODQ
Gibbard that I find instructive.14 Quasi-realism is a fundamentally 
non-realist view but one that seeks to mimic realism in ways that 
will keep various unpalatable forms of normative scepticism at bay. 
But what sort of realism, Gibbard asks, is the quasi-realist to mimic? 
He distinguishes here between what he calls vast and tempered 
UHDOLVP³:KHUHDVYDVWQRUPDtive realism treats our judgments as 
indicators of facts separate from us, laying us open to the question of 
whether our judgments are truly indications at all of normative facts 
independent of us, any more than the judgments of exotic peoples 
are, this tempered realism does no such thing. It cultivates standards 
IRUZKHQQRUPDWLYHMXGJPHQWVDUHWREHWUXVWHGEXWGRHVQ¶WIROORZ
through on treating our judgments fully as indicators of independent 
IDFWV´15 It is tempered, not vast realism, he argues, while claiming 
the dialectical advantage over the tempered realist of being better 
placed to explain the tempering. Because the quasi-realist mimics 
only the tempered realist, he needs to secure a certain degree of 
mind-LQGHSHQGHQFHEXWQRWHQRXJKIRU6WUHHW¶VGLlemma to bite. 
Here Gibbard is in large measure echoing thoughts he had aired 
much earlier in his 1990 book Wise Choices, Apt-Feelings in 
defending the view he there called norm-expressivism. He had not 
yet at that time explicitly adopted from Blackburn the quasi-realist 
take on his philosophical enterprise he has now embraced; but he 
did, in the brilliant and too-little discussed Part III of that book, 
endeavour illuminatingly to show how norm expressivism could be 
reconciled with modest forms of objectivity, even if not with what 
                                                 
13
 Street 2011, p. 13. 
14
 Gibbard 2011. 
15Ibid.,  p. 44 
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he calls grandiose objectivity.16 :KLOH*LEEDUG¶VYiew has evolved 
significantly between 1990 and his 2011 response to Street, there is 
enough deep continuity there for it to make good sense to understand 
grandiose objectivity as what we would need to secure if we sought 
to mimic vast, and not merely tempered realism. Both here and in 
the reply to Street, we can read Gibbard as urging that modest 
objectivity is all we need for normative thought and discourse to 
serve its core purpose of securing the coordinating benefits of 
normative discussion.  
 
3. How to be a Quasi-Realist Without Being Smug 
 
I have now set the stage for a little virtue ethics. For, in 
WKLQNLQJDERXW(JDQ¶VFRQFHUQVLWZLOOVXUHO\EHLQVWUXFWLYH to do a 
bit of thinking about the interesting vice of smugness. The first thing 
to do, I think, is to acknowledge that it is indeed a vice. And we 
should be clear what sort of vice it is and in what sort of contexts it 
is an appropriate thing for us to identify and object to. I think, first of 
all, it is a vice that has an opposite vice. A vice, that is, whose 
corresponding virtue has the familiar Aristotelian feature of lying on 
a mean between two undesirable extremes.17 The opposite vice to 
smugness, I take it, would be a kind of moral pusillanimity, a 
FDWDVWURSKLFODFNRIFRQILGHQFHLQRQH¶VRZQPRUDOFRQYLFWLRQVDQG
commitments. The virtuous mean is a proper but not excessive moral 
humility, or to say much the same thing but with a different 
emphasis, a healthy, but cautious confidence.18  
 This virtue and these vices have as their primary sphere of 
application, that part of human experience that is concerned with 
normative conflict and disagreement and the kind of normative 
conversation and mutual engagement that seeks to address such 
conflict and disagreement. It is immensely important that we should 
have such conversations for we desire to live together at peace in 
                                                 
16
 Gibbard 1990, pp. 199-201.  
17
 Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2.  
18
 Again Gibbard iVWKHUHDKHDGRIPH³A person who is wholly unpersuadable would get few benefits 
from normative discussion...He would be a poor candidate for cooperative social life; he would risk 
ostracism. It would also be costly, though, to be a pushover in discussion. To evince compliance to any 
demands whatsoever, so long as they were made in the name of putative norms, would open a person to 
manipulation. What might be advantageous then, is some tendency to gravitate towards the norms of 
those around one, together with some firmness in sticking to the norms one has hitherto accepted. ³
1990, pp. 77-78. 
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some semblance of moral community and some rational means of 
managing, containing and where possible resolving disagreement is 
vital if we are to do this. 
 It is a question here of virtues and vices applicable to 
conversation between human beings who disagree with each other. 
Coming to such conversations we bring with us our moral opinions 
and convictions. The quasi-realist has an expressivist take on what 
these are. My own version of this take is, at first approximation, this. 
When I say, Torture is wrong, I express my unwillingness to accept 
as the governing code for my moral community any code that 
permits torture. An unwillingness is not a belief, hence the 
expressivism. And when you disagree you are best understood as 
expressing a state of mind of a similar kind. Now if you are in the 
grip of old fashioned parodies of old fashioned emotivism, you will 
think there is nothing gong on here except an exercise in mutual 
emotional sounding off that leave the conversation with nowhere, in 
the way of mutual rational engagement to go. But this picture is 
seldom if ever true: in particular, where disagreement is not 
fundamental, it will tend not to be. Even where we disagree in ways 
that are profound and disturbing, such disagreement almost always 
takes place against a massive background of agreement. Where there 
is a context of shared norms and shared standards of what count as 
compelling considerations in moral argumentation, there is a 
possibility of reasoned argument and constructive moral 
conversation among parties that disagree. 
 Because we often do disagree and because we have to live 
together in rather a limited space, it matters that we have such 
conversations. We need, as Gibbard emphasizes, to work out in 
community what to do, think and feel19, to put our heads together.20 
And we can moralize about what norms should govern these 
activities, or what virtues ideally equip us for them. As I have noted, 
a core such virtue plausibly lies on a mean between a dogmatic 
smugness and a craven lack of confidence. Dogmatic smugness is 
obviously a vice. But lack of confidence is no less clearly another. I 
think the actions of sadistic bullies are wicked. I think it is wrong to 
WRUWXUHSHRSOH,GRQ¶WWKLQNUDSHLVDJRRGZD\RIREWDLQLQJVH[XDO
gratification. And you know what, I am really pretty smug about 
these convictions. And I doubt if you think that especially 
                                                 
19
 1990, p. 72. 
20
 2011, p. 48. 
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epistemicall\GHOLQTXHQWRQP\SDUW,GRQ¶WRIWHQFDWFKP\VHOI
WKLQNLQJ,WKLQNZDQWRQFUXHOW\LVZURQJEXWPD\EH,¶PZURQJ
about that$QG,GRQ¶WWKLQN,DPPXFKDWIDXOWQRWWKLQNLQJWKLV On 
WKHRWKHUKDQG,VKRXOGQ¶WPDNHWKLQJVWRRHDV\IRUP\VHOIE\
exploiting too readily the emotional buttons I know examples like 
this must press. I know too, after all, that history is full of people 
who held, with equally unshakeably confidence, moral beliefs that I 
no less confidently reject.  
 If you and I are to live together in a single moral community 
and if we do not agree on certain questions about what moral 
standards should govern our community, we need to talk. And if we 
are virtuous we will strike the right balance between too much 
smugness and too much humility. NRZKHUH¶VDFODLPDERXWWKH
ethics of such conversations that seems to me very plausible and that 
,WKLQNTXLWHFUXFLDOWRGHIXVLQJ(JDQ¶VFHQWUDOFRQFHUQ. We should 
H[SHFWDODUJHPHDVXUHRIUHFLSURFLW\,VKRXOGQ¶WGHPDQGRI\RXWKDW
you bring to the conversation a level of humility, an openness to 
influence and readiness to change of mind, greater than I am 
prepared to bring myself. Nor should you, in turn, make a 
comparable demand of me. So there is no concern, here at the level 
of the norms that govern the conduct of moral disagreement, with 
any first person asymmetry. And so long as I do not demand of you 
a level of humility, an openness to influence and readiness to change 
of mind, greater than I am prepared to bring myself, I think I am 
exonerated, in a way consistent with quasi-realism, of any charge of 
smugness.  
 
4. Modest Objectivity and Moral Conversation 
 
 Here is an optimistic but I hope not foolish conjecture. 
Disagreements between human beings, and particularly 
disagreements between human beings historically close enough to 
HQJDJHHDFKRWKHUDVFRQYHUVDWLRQDOSDUWQHUVDUHVHOGRPLQ(JDQ¶V
sense, fundamental. However we can readily at least conceive of 
circumstances where moral conversation has no prospect of 
resolving moral disagreement. We can conceive of circumstances 
where your moral sensibility is so profoundly unlike my own that 
nothing I could say to you, or you to me, could ever gain rational 
SXUFKDVH,Q:LOOLDPV¶WHUPLQRORJ\ZHPLJKWVD\\RXKDYHQR
internal reason to agree with me or I with you ± no sound 
11 
 
deliberative route can take us from where we are to a place where we 
agree.21 If this were the case, it might not necessarily make our 
conversation wholly pointless. We might conduct it in a public 
forum where we each hoped to influence by our words, not the other, 
but those listening in our audience. But certainly a private 
conversation, where there is nothing for us to do except engage in 
futile mutual browbeating is likely to be largely pointless. 
 It is one thing for our conversation to be pointless in this way. 
It is another for us to know this. In practice it can be very difficult to 
tell in advance how intractable a particular disagreement is going to 
be. To acknowledge the pointlessness of moral conversation is to 
recognize a moment of political crisis, to recognize that the 
possibility of our living together in moral community is imperilled. 
Reasonably reluctant to do that, we may give the possibility of moral 
conversation the benefit of the doubt and carry on talking. Otherwise 
why ever would we bother? The fact that I bother talking to you at 
all thus plausibly carries, at least ordinarily, an implicature that I 
GRQ¶WWKLQNWKLVLVDZDVWHRIWLPH and consequently WKDW,GRQ¶W
think our disagreement, in this way, fundamental.22  
 By talking to each other at all, we normally presuppose that 
our disagreement is not fundamental. And with other human beings 
we encounter and talk to this optimistic presupposition is perhaps 
ordinarily right.23 But it might of course conceivably go wrong. 
Fundamental disagreement is certainly possible. Consider the 
characters I will call The OthersZLWKDQXSSHUFDVHµ2¶WR
emphasize just how terribly other they are. The Others live on a 
distant planet in a remote galaxy and, while they are recognizably 
rational creatures, while indeed they are really rather clever, their 
moral beliefs are, by our lights, immensely alien and strange and 
perhaps rather horrible.  
                                                 
21
 Williams 1981. 
22
 Cf. Finlay 2008, pp. 257-258, Lenman, forthcoming.  
23
 This may be questioned by pointing to the abundant documentation for very deep and extensive 
moral disagreement. See e.g. Doris and Plakias 2008, Olson 2011, esp. p. 72. But the significance of 
this can be overrated. Deep and extensive is not at all the same as fundamental. Three pints are worth 
stressing. (1) It is important to notice how even deep disagreement ordinarily has, as noted above, a 
massive background of agreement. Because the former is a problem it is often far more salient to us 
than the latter but we should not ignore the latter. (2) Fundamental disagreement is disagreement that is 
is not resolved when parties are fully rational and fully informed. As all human parties to actual 
disagreement tend to be very far from fully informed and very imperfectly rational, we should properly 
be extremely cautious in diagnosing that disagreement is fundamental (much more so, I would suggest, 
that Doris and Plakias). (3) Fundamental disagreement is not the same as disagreement about 
fundamentals and cases of the latter need not be cases of the former. (See the discussion of Olson in 
Lenman, forthcoming.) 
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Would there be any point in having a conversation with The 
Others in the fabulously unlikely event that I should ever encounter 
them? Perhaps with a view to arriving at some kind of ethnographic 
understanding of these strange and interesting creatures. But not 
with a view of making a normative community with them. Our 
pervasive and fundamental disagreement, we may suppose, renders 
that project a futile one. So the norms that govern moral 
conversation and the appropriate virtues of balancing confidence and 
humility, avoiding both a craven deference and an unpardonable 
smugness, hardly apply. But do I nonetheless want smugly to affirm 
that they are wrong and I am right? 
 1RWUHDOO\QR,GRQ¶WUHDOO\VHHWKHSRLQWLQVD\LQJDQ\WKLQJRI
the sort. The point of moral thought and conversation is to negotiate 
conflict and arrive at moral understandings that I and those with 
whom I seek to live in moral community can stably reflectively 
HQGRUVH7KDW¶VDORFDOSUREOHPWRZKLFKWKHGLVWDQWDQGDOLHQ2WKHUV
have no relevance. In a case like this, something like what Williams 
called the relativism of distance is surely the most appropriate 
response.24  Are The Others wrong? Not really, they are just very 
different. Perhaps we might find it rather horrible that they behave 
the way they do just as it is horrible that people get cancer and there 
are sometimes terrible earthquakes, but, as in the latter cases, the 
thought here is not really a moral thought and the concern is not 
really moral concern. There is nothing helpful by way of moralizing 
to be said about them and certainly nothing of the sort to be said to 
them. As Gibbard observes in chapter 10 of Wise Choices, Apt 
Feelings³:KDWPDWWHUVFKLHIO\LVQRWZKDWZHFDQVD\WRVWUDQJH
beings who are merely conceivable but what we can say to each 
RWKHU´25 
 This should come as no surprise. Quasi-realism is not realism. 
The truth is not out there. Nothing moral is out there; just a few 
squillion atoms doing their stuff. The truth, as Hume emphasized, is 
in here.26 Pace Nagel27LW¶VXOWLPDWHO\just us. The moral outlook we 
possess and express in our moral judgements has a generous 
measure of built in moral mind-independence. So, according to the 
RXWORRNPRVWRIXVVKDUHWKHZURQJQHVVRINLOOLQJZRXOGQ¶WFKDQJH
                                                 
24
 Williams 1985, chapter 9. 
25
 Gibbard 1990, p. 201. &RPSDUHKLVUHPDUNVLQKLVSRQWKHIXWLOLW\RI³SXWWLQJRXUKHDGV
together with those with whom we stand in fundamental disagreement. 
26
 Hume 2000, pp. 301-302 (3.1.1).  
27
 Nagel 1997. 
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LI,VWRSSHGGLVDSSURYLQJLILW%XWRIFRXUVHLW¶VMXVWour outlook. 
The moral truths it expresses did not shape its evolution. It is Man 
who has shaped the Way, the Way did not shape Man.28 Street may 
or may not be right that this should embarrass the realist. It certainly 
need not embarrass the expressivist unless the expressivist insists on 
a level of mind-independence far greater than he will ever, for any 
practical purpose, require, unless, in other words, he aspires to 
grandiose objectivity.  
 ³What matters chiefly is not what we can say to strange beings 
who are merely conceivable but what we can say to eacKRWKHU´
That thought is at the heart of what the expressivist should say in 
response to Egan. Smugness is a vice the invocation of which is 
most clearly relevant in the context of the moral reflection and 
conversation we have with each other. And, as with other vices, 
there is a story to be told about why it is a vice, a story grounded in 
our ideas about what such moral reflection and conversation is for 
and the attitudes and expectations that are appropriate to our partners 
in it. This story, a story the expressivist is abundantly equipped to 
tell, is a fragment of moral epistemology but telling it is just a piece 
of moralizing, first order philosophical ethics as Mackie would have 
it. Telling it gives us pretty well all we need to make sense of when 
and why smugness is a vice and why there are no first-person 
asymmetries in the normative requirement to avoid it.  
,GRQ¶WWKLQNZHQHHGZRUU\DERXWEHLQJLVRODWHGIURPWKH
moral truth in the way Egan imagines. Moral truth, as expressivists 
understand it, jusWLVQ¶WUREXVWly objective enough for that to be a 
genuine and intelligible possibility. What should worry us is the 
possibility of being isolated from each other, of finding our moral 
community broken by division of opinion on matters that are 
intractable and irresolvable, where the only sort of moral community 
you are prepared to find acceptable would be entirely intolerable to 
me. That would a political tragedy for which the supposed 
metaphysical reassurances of more realistic takes on metaethics 
would offer little real relief 
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